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Introductory note: This text is based on a public speech delivered at the University of Heidelberg 
as part of the “Monday Conferences” in the Summer Term of 2014. 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
First, I would like to thank you for inviting me to speak to you today. It is a great pleasure to 
share my thoughts on the topic “The European Union and its reidentification as a guardian of 
human rights”. 
Let me say right away that we are all witnesses to a tremendously exciting phase in the 
development of Europe’s legal systems. For lawyers it is thus a great challenge to understand 
the complex constellations of the European multi-level systems in detail and even more so to 
illustrate them. Our topic today holds a key position in this context. 
Since the beginning of the European integration movement in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, the relationship of the European Union and its predecessor organisations with the 
protection of fundamental rights has not been an easy one. The European Economic 
Community (EEC) (established on 25 March 1957 in Rome by its six founding nations) as well 
as its successor organisations, the European Community (EC) and today’s European Union 
(EU) are a ”creation of law”,1 and as such they necessitate a strong link to historically and 
politically legitimising elements such as the safeguarding of fundamental and human rights. 
Only such a legitimisation can prevent the codifying of this supranational legal order2 in a way 
that EU citizens would perceive as an unjustifiable subjugation. 
In this context, the following question arises: What does the protection of fundamental rights 
need to look like in order for the EU to be perceived as just and humane and to bear out its 
claims to be a home for its citizens? 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Hallstein, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft, 5nd ed. 1979, p. 53.   
2
 Cf. in this regard Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre: Einleitung in die rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik, 1st ed. 1934.   
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B. Developing the protection of human rights in the EU 
 
I. How did the protection of human rights come into the Union? 
 
Considering the numerous changes to the European Union since its foundation in the late 
1950s, it is hardly surprising that the protection of human rights did not play a major role right 
from the beginning.3 As the name suggests, the EEC was more about economic cooperation. 
However, some powers in Europe had already hoped for more integration. In fact, the European 
Economic Community was a rescue attempt following an initiative on establishing the European 
Political Community (EPC) that failed due to a vote in the French national assembly in the year 
of 1954.4 The European Political Community had aimed at comprehensively reshaping the 
political landscape in the six member states of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC); Article 2 of its draft statute formulated safeguarding human and fundamental rights as 
their primary goal.5 
However, in the light of the experiences following the Second World War, most European 
policymakers considered the granting of fundamental and human rights to be a “domaine 
réservé” of the single member states. This is shown by the fact that the 1950 European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the most important piece of legislation for the European 
protection of human rights, was created by the Council of Europe, an institution that works 
according to intergovernmental principles. Today, the Council of Europe’s executive – the 
minister committee – still works according to the principle “one state, one vote”. It was not until 
the ratification of the eleventh additional protocol of the ECHR, which came into force on the 1st 
of November 1998, that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the guardian of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, took on a supranational character, comparable to the 
European Union’s legal system today. 
It thus at first seemed that the protection of fundamental rights was to share the fate of the failed 
initiative on a federal political collaboration and remain in the competence of the single member 
states. 
 
                                                          
3
 Kingreen, in: Calliess/Ruffert (eds.), AEUV/EUV, 4th ed. 2011, Art. 6 EUV, paras 4 et seq.   
4
 Margedant, in: Bergmann (ed.), Handlexikon der Europäischen Union, 4th ed. 2012, key word “Politische Union”, 
II - 2.   
5
 Cf. Draft Treaty establishing a statue of the European Communities, adopted by the ad-hoc-assembly on 
10/03/1953, Art. 2, 1st indent.   
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II. The first years 
 
However, whoever thought that in economic cooperation the protection of fundamental and 
human rights could simply be ignored was proved wrong. In the early 1960s, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (ECJ) established the primacy of EU law.6 The Court thus 
created a new legal category, which was neither national nor international law. Moreover, this 
new common legislation of Europe was to take precedence in conflict situations with national 
law, in order to safeguard the community spirit. However, the judges at this court, working at the 
time for the predecessors of the European Union, only had a small number of legal acts at their 
disposal on which to base their case law.  
This, together with the fact that the EEC was beginning to play an ever more dominant role in 
the life of citizens and enterprises, necessarily led to disputes in the area of the protection of 
fundamental rights. The first important rulings were about member states handing out 
subsidised butter to people in need who were to be expelled7 and about the foreclosure of 
private assets.8 From the late 1960s, it was thus clear that the European Union and its 
predecessor organisations could not adopt a neutral stance on the protection of fundamental 
rights. 
  
III. Substantiation and consolidation 
 
From the angle of the Luxemburg judges, the problem to be resolved consisted of easing the 
tension between the poles of the precedence and autonomy of Union law, on the one hand, and 
granting fundamental and human rights without a binding Community bill of rights, on the other. 
The many observers and co-artisans of the process of European integration rapidly became 
impatient: From the beginning the Federal Constitutional Court [in Karlsruhe] had also defended 
the guaranteeing of appropriate protection of fundamental rights in the European Community.9 
And with this argument about the practical shaping of the protection of fundamental rights at the 
European level there began the discussion between Karlsruhe and Luxemburg about the 
successful distribution of competences between the lower and upper houses (Bundestag and 
                                                          
6
 ECJ, Case 6-64, Costa, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66; ECJ, Case 26-62, van Gend & Loos, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1.   
7
 ECJ, Case 29-69, Stauder, ECLI:EU:C:1969:57; today you might call it a data protection problem.  
8
 ECJ, Case 4-73, Nold, ECLI:EU:C:1974:51.   
9
 Voßkuhle, Der europäische Verfassungsgerichtsverbund, NVwZ 2010, p. 6.   
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Bundesrat) in Berlin and the European institutions in Brussels, Luxemburg and Strasbourg.10 
This balancing act increasingly shifted away from the protection of fundamental rights to other 
institutional issues, particularly during the “euro crisis”. We are reminded e.g. of the decisions 
and rulings of the Federal Constitutional Court judges in 2014 on the European stability 
mechanism.11 
This circumstance may be partly rooted in the fact the judges at the European Court of Justice 
in Luxemburg developed a very elegant solution to the problem of lack of sources for 
fundamental rights and have elaborated it further over the years. Anyone reading Article 6(3) of 
the Treaty on European Union (TEU) today can understand that the judges did not rely directly 
on Union law but chose “constitutional traditions common to the Member States”12 as the basis 
for Community human rights protection. In other words, they used the list of fundamental and 
human rights contained in the constitutions of all the Member States combined in the individual 
case by the ECJ. 
Moreover, the judges were able to note a certain harmonisation with respect to human rights by 
international cooperation in Europe, since all member states of the European Economic 
Community had ratified the Council of Europe’s European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Through a total consideration of all these sets of 
fundamental and human rights catalogues, urgent legal questions with a fundamental rights 
context could be satisfactorily clarified against the background of a teleological, i.e. goal and 
purpose-oriented interpretation of Union law.13 In addition, the ECJ attempted to confine itself to 
absolutely necessary statements with respect to questions relating to fundamental rights. 
However, this approach came in for renewed criticism starting in the 1990s. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam significantly broadened the competences of the Community in the fields of 
coordinating justice, home affairs and security policy.14 As of then, the legal order of the 
European Union covered areas that were closely related to fundamental rights.15  
                                                          
10
 Cf. the “as long as” case law of the Karlsruhe judges originating from BVerfGE 37, 271 et seq. to the “Honeywell“-
decision, 2 BvR 2661/06 (BAG) or the “Lisbon Judgment“, BVerfGE 123, 267.   
11
 2 BvR 1390/12; cf. for the BVerfGs first request to the European Court for a preliminary ruling in the context of 
the “OMT”-decision Brosius-Linke, Die Vorlageentscheidung des BVerfG – Dogmatischer Stellungskampf mit Risiko, 
Saar Expert Papers, 1/2014.   
12
 Art. 6(3) TEU.   
13
 Cf. 2 BvR 197/83.   
14
 Hilf / Pache, Der Vertrag von Amsterdam, NJW 1998, p. 706.   
15
 Cf. for the actual legal situation Callewaert, Grundrechtsschutz und gegenseitige Anerkennung im Raum der 
Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des Rechts, ZEuS 2014, p. 80 et seq.   
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The Union, and more specifically the ECJ, was criticised for having an under-developed 
fundamental rights dogma and consequently an insufficient human rights monitoring regime.16 
This circumstance was also politically intolerable for a united Europe since the protection of 
fundamental and human rights is regarded as the continent’s trademark. In addition, the EU’s 
ever greater enlargement towards the East revealed the need for an improved institutional form 
for these rights.17 
 
IV. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
 
At the end of the millennium it was therefore understandable that the EU needed to take new 
steps to protect fundamental rights: On 3rd and 4th June 1999 the heads of state or government 
agreed to draw up a Charter of Fundamental Rights in order to visibly enshrine the extraordinary 
significance and scope of these rights for the citizens of the Union. In order to perform this task, 
the European Council decided to appoint a separate body (‘Convention’) with representatives 
from the European Parliament, the national parliaments and governments, and the 
Commission.18 This Convention, chaired by the former federal president of Germany, Roman 
Herzog,19 rapidly made progress and soon presented a finished draft. The solemn proclamation 
followed on 7th of December 2000 in Nice.20 
Originally the Charter was to have been part of the constitutional treaty of the European Union, 
but the latter’s ratification process came to a stop after its rejection in the referenda held in 
France and the Netherlands.21 The Charter of Fundamental Rights thus became what could be 
called a jelled substrate of the constitutional traditions common to the Member States.22 As 
such, the number of references by courts and academics rapidly increased, which in a certain 
sense led to a de facto acceptance of the authority of the document.  
                                                          
16
 Schroeder, Neues zur Grundrechtskontrolle in der Europäischen Union, EuZW 2011, p. 462.   
17
 Giegerich, Die “europäische Föderation” – unendliche Annäherung an eine Utopie, in: Giegerich (ed.), 
Herausforderungen und Perspektiven der EU, 2012, p. 7.   
18
 Report from the Commission, Third Report of the Commission on Citizenship of the Union, COM(2001) 506 final.; 
cf. European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, Annex IV, reproduced in: Bulletin of the EU 6/1999, p. 39 et 
seq.   
19
 Häfner et al., In der Auseinandersetzung um eine Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, ZRP 2000, p. 
365.   
20
 Tettinger, Die Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, NJW 2001, p. 1010.   
21
 Rabe, Zur Metamorphose des Europäischen Verfassungsvertrags, NJW 2007, p. 3153.   
22
 Huber, Auslegung und Anwendung der Charta der Grundrechte, NJW 2011, p. 2385.   
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With the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty on the 1st of December 2009 the Charter 
ultimately gained binding status, although it did not become a direct part of the treaties. It now 
supplements the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union in terms of primary law.23 
The remarkable thing about this document is that, from the start, it has almost exclusively been 
praised for the rights and guarantees it contains: With 54 Articles the Charter is extraordinarily 
long for a bill of fundamental rights. Its seven chapters ranging from dignity, freedoms, equality 
and solidarity to justice provide a comprehensive picture of the relationship of the individual to 
European sovereign power. The Charter does not omit any area of life, and even takes a 
position on current issues of medicine and biotechnology.24 
On the other hand, serious differences of opinion were expressed regarding their scope of 
application. Heated political and academic discussions took place on the extent to which they 
were binding. Some took the view that the Charter did not change the existing European 
fundamental rights architecture in any way and only bound the EU institutions in implementing 
Union law. This attitude explained the opt-out statements by the United Kingdom and Poland 
during the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.25 The Czech Republic also first had difficulties in 
accepting the new EU fundamental rights instrument26 although it since seems to have changed 
its position.27 There were others who wanted to interpret the Charter as a “reserve” in the event 
of an inefficient national protection of fundamental rights.28 
Ultimately the issue is always how Union law should be implemented with respect for human 
dignity and what is to be the criterion for this within the European Union. After all, most of the 
realisation of union law is not done by EU officials but by the public administrations of the 
Member States. However, if the latter category of indirect implementation of Union law were 
settled directly by the Charter, this would considerably increase its relevance for the Member 
States and the Union citizens. 
                                                          
23
 Cf. Art. 6(1) TEU.   
24
 Knöll, Die Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union – Inhalte, Bewertung und Ausblick, NVwZ 2001, p. 
393.   
25
 Cf. Protocol (No 30) on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland 
and to the United Kingdom. 
26
 Pache / Rösch, Die neue Grundrechtsordnung der EU nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, EuR 2009, p. 783.   
27
 Originally it was envisaged that after the completion of the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty there would 
be a new amendment of the treaties and protocols in order to make the position of the Czech Republic similar to 
the UK’s. This could have been achieved during the accession of Croatia as the 28
th
 member of the Union, which 
was finalized on 01/07/2013. However, nothing happened. 
28
 Kirchhof, Grundrechtsschutz durch europäische und nationale Gerichte, NJW 2011, p. 3685.   
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V. The new line of case law in Luxemburg 
 
This difference of opinion was again characterised by the case law of the ECJ. In the decision 
on the “Åkerberg Fransson” case of 26 February 2013 the judges stated that the fundamental 
rights guaranteed under Union law were applicable in all cases governed by Union law but not 
outside it.29 
Although this does not sound very spectacular, it clearly meant that the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union was also directly applicable to those matters that – in simple 
terms – are only harmonised and not finally settled by a legal act of the European Union.30 In 
other words, the Charter suddenly received a very broad area of application, which made the 
Luxemburg court a central component of European human rights protection and, by the same 
token, meant that the fundamental rights contained in the Charter were of substantial and 
tangible significance for the approximately 500 million citizens of the European Union. Directly 
after the ruling there was still speculation as to whether the ECJ would maintain this new, bold 
line of jurisprudence. So far, however, the tendency has seemed to be that the judges will 
continue to expand their role as a guardian of human rights.31 This was shown clearly32 by the 
spectacular ruling on the 8th of April 2014 revoking the Data Retention Directive,33 which 
infringed Article 7 (Respect for private life) and 8 (Protection of personal data) of the Charter. 
The recent judgement in the Google Spain case was also following the same track.34 
The gratifying tendency of the ECJ to intensify the protection of fundamental and human rights 
in the Union does not always meet with approval, however.35 Particularly the German Federal 
Constitutional Court lost no time in expressing its doubts about a new boundary in the area of 
protecting human rights.36 
                                                          
29
 ECJ, Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, para 19.   
30
 Gstrein / Zeitzmann, Die "Åkerberg Fransson"-Entscheidung des EuGH - "Ne Bis In Idem" als Wegbereiter für 
einen effektiven Grundrechtsschutz in der EU?, ZEuS 2013, p. 247 et seq.   
31
 Cf. ECJ, Case C-418/11, Texdata Software GmbH, OJ C 344 of 23/11/2013, p. 10; ECJ, C-265/13, Marcos vs. Korota 
SA, para 29; ECJ, C-176/12, Association de médiation sociale, OJ C 85 of 22/03/2014, p. 3, para 42.   
32
 ECJ, Joined Cases C-293/12, C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland.   
33
 Directive 2006/24/EG.   
34
 ECJ, Case C-131/12, Google Spain und Google. 
35
 Thym, Die Reichweite der EU-Grundrechte-Charta – Zu viel Grundrechtsschutz?, NVwZ 2013, p. 891 et seq.   
36
 Giegerich, Introduction: Trying to Fathom the Shallows of European Unification, in: Giegerich/Gstrein/Zeitzmann 
(eds.), The EU Between ‘an Ever Closer Union’ and Inalienable Policy Domains of Member States, 2014, p. 33 et 
seq.   
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Alluding to the “Solange” case law37 of the Karlsruhe judges, some even speak now of a 
“reverse Solange” situation.38 In other words, the ECJ, or the EU, are now the ones to set the 
standard to be kept by national supreme courts with regard to questions of fundamental rights. 
This is dubious for critical constitutional courts, like those in Germany, Denmark and the Czech 
Republic, because – due to the form of Union law – they are more closely bound to the case law 
of the ECJ than the decisions of the judges at the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg.39 
There is no doubt that the institutional balance between national and European supreme courts 
must be kept in mind as we analyse this development. At present the process of accession by 
the European Union to the European Human Rights Convention is still underway. The question 
arises as to whether the ECJ might want to be more pro-active in questions of fundamental 
rights in order to preserve its institutional position vis-à-vis the European Court of Human Rights 
in Strasbourg.40 The only certain thing so far is that the already complex European fundamental 
rights architecture is becoming increasingly more complex.41 
 
C. The European Union as a guardian of human rights? 
 
As we evaluate the contention that the EU has reidentified itself as a guardian of human rights, 
we must consider three central factors. 
First, EU law is constantly adding new competences and regulatory material. This recently 
necessitated the amendment of the Lisbon Treaty and the discussion about the euro, sovereign 
debt and the bank crisis. These matters have pressed changes on the institutions.42 But also the 
area of foreign and security policy is a legal matter that has not been harmonised by the 
                                                          
37
 BVerfGE 37, 271 et seq.   
38
 Von Bogdandy, et al., Reverse Solange: Protecting the Essence of Fundamental Rights against EU Member States, 
CML Rev. 49, 2012, p. 489; cf. also Canor, Solange horizontal – Der Schutz der EU-Grundrechte zwischen 
Mitgliedstaaten, ZaöRV 2013, p. 249 et seq.   
39
 Lange, Verschiebungen im europäischen Grundrechtssystem?, NVwZ 2014, p. 173; Klein, Straßburger Wolken am 
Karlsruher Himmel – Zum geänderten Verhältnis zwischen Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europäischem 
Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte seit 1998, NVwZ 2010, p. 221-225.   
40
 Gstrein, Der geeinte Menschenrechtsschutz im Europa der Vielfalt – Zum Verhältnis der Luxemburger und 
Straßburger Gerichtshöfe nach Beitritt der Europäischen Union zur Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, ZEuS 
2012, point C.   
41
 Polakiewicz, EU law and the ECHR: will the European Union's accession square the circle?, E.H.R.L.R. 2013, 6, p. 
592.   
42
 Kadelbach, Lehren aus der Finanzkrise – Ein Vorschlag zur Reform der Politischen Institutionen der Europäischen 
Union, EuR 2013, p. 497 et seq.   
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European Union.43 The increasing interconnections of regions in the context of globalisation will, 
however, make it ever more necessary and effective for Europeans to speak with one voice on 
these matters.44 Hesitant moves in this direction are the EU High Representative,45 the 
European External Action Service (EEAS)46 and the European Defence Agency.47 
Secondly, not only the scope of the areas governed by Union law is growing, but also the 
intensity with which they affect the life of citizens. This is exemplified in the above-mentioned 
ruling on Data Retention,48 or the case law of the ECJ relating to Internet Service Providers and 
their obligation to monitor the activity of their customers in the event of the latter’s infringement 
of copyright.49 
And thirdly, the institutional position of the Union in the protection of fundamental and human 
rights continues to be questionable. It has to find its place in the structure made up of national 
supreme courts, global institutions such as the UN’s Human Rights Council50 and other regional 
institutions, such as the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. In this connection, the 
conclusion of the accession negotiations of the EU to the Council of Europe’s European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is undoubtedly of outstanding importance at the 
moment.51 
The process of reidentifying the European Union in the area of human rights protection must 
therefore be analysed against the background outlined above. If this is to be successful, there 
will be some tangible challenges to meet. 
 
 
 
                                                          
43
 Cf. Art. 24(1) second subparagrah.   
44
 Cf. for an analysis of the constitutional requirements Kadelbach, National Constitutional Reservations with 
Respect to External Security Policy, p. 210 et seq.; Stein, National Constitutional Reservations with Respect to 
Internal Security Policy, p. 203 et seq., both in Giegerich/Gstrein/Zeitzmann (eds.), The EU Between ‘an Ever Closer 
Union’ and Inalienable Policy Domains of Member States, 2014.   
45
 Art. 18 TEU.   
46
 Martenczuk, Der Europäische Auswärtige Dienst, EuR-Bei 2012, p. 189 et seq.   
47
 Art. 45 TEU; Heuninckx, The European Defence Agency Capability Development Plan and the European 
Armaments Cooperation Strategy, P.P.L.R. 2009, 4, NA136-143.   
48
 ECJ, Joined Cases C-293/12, C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland.   
49
 ECJ, Case C-360/10, SABAM, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85; Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien.   
50
 Established in United Nations, A/Res/60/251, resolution of 03/04/2006.   
51
 Polakiewicz, EU law and the ECHR: will the European Union's accession square the circle?, E.H.R.L.R. 2013, 6, p. 
597 et seq.   
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I. The multi-level system of protection of European fundamental rights 
 
In Europe the multi-faceted national, regional and global systems for the protection of 
fundamental and human rights are closely intertwined, which is both a blessing and a curse. 
The last few decades have seen the establishment of a dialogue on fundamental rights between 
the different legal systems or (supreme) courts in Europe which has taken the form of a 
horizontal and semi-vertical exchange. This discourse is being conducted beyond the borders of 
the European Union.52 
The result has been a mutual cross-fertilisation with new ideas and approaches and a process 
of administering justice tending towards a convergence between the different standpoints.53 In 
this context, socially controversial topics such as the abolition of the death penalty,54 the 
question of the legal admissibility of abortion, dealing with assisted dying or the state approval 
of homosexual marriages have, through mutually observing behaviour in the individual states, 
gradually led to the evolution of legal principles. The individual countries and their institutions 
first have a broad margin of appreciation in handing down their decisions, which over time 
crystallises into a normative principle through common, supranational legislation and case law. 
This can be called “normative crystallisation”. A common standard is created although initially 
the form it will take is open, along the lines of the slogan of the European Union: “United in 
diversity.” 
Here regional courts like the ECJ or the ECtHR in Strasbourg only seem to have an outstanding 
and privileged position. That is because national courts do not hesitate to openly question their 
even only implicit claims to have higher status. For example, the president of the Federal 
Constitutional Court, Andreas Voßkuhle, would rather see the European system of protecting 
fundamental rights as a “mobile” and not e.g. a pyramid.55 The European association of 
constitutional courts is, according to his views, a living and changing organ that, as it continues 
to develop, deserves ongoing monitoring, accompaniment and balancing.56 
But this opinion does not seem to be shared by supreme court judges everywhere in Europe. 
National constitutional courts such as the Austrian one, which recognised the legally binding 
                                                          
52
 Hertig Randall, Der grundrechtliche Dialog der Gerichte in Europa, EuGRZ 2014, p. 7 et seq. 
53
 Ibid., p. 18.   
54
 Ibid., p. 10 et seq.   
55
 Voßkuhle, Pyramide oder Mobile? – Menschenrechtsschutz durch die europäischen Verfassungsgerichte, EuGRZ 
2014, p. 165-167.   
56
 Ibid., p. 165.   
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effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union for itself, even before the 
ECJ handed down its ruling on the “Åkerberg Fransson” case,57 seem rather to presuppose a 
pyramid structure of European jurisdiction in questions of fundamental rights. 
However, we have to broaden our sights. The Commission of the European Union is correct 
when it indicates, that the EU institutions must go further than merely respecting the legal 
requirements vested in the Charter. They must continue fulfilling the political task of promoting a 
fundamental rights culture for all citizens, economic actors and public authorities alike. The fact 
that the Commission has received more than 3 000 letters from the general public regarding the 
respect of fundamental rights indicates that individuals are aware of their rights and demand 
respect for them.58 
A concrete example is the above-mentioned decision of the Austrian constitutional court, more 
precisely the underlying facts of the case. Here the person affected by a sovereign measure, 
appealing against a decision by the Austrian asylum authorities, referred directly to the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, without there apparently being a normative 
reference point for doing so. 
Ultimately we must conclude that, although the system of European protection of fundamental 
rights works as a whole, it is very complex and therefore many traps must be avoided on the 
path towards the correct resolution of the problems. About sixty years after its creation it is not 
yet complete. This may be perceived as a problem, but also as an opportunity: only this way can 
a system preserve diversity over time without becoming institutionally unstable. 
 
II. The problem of effective legal protection 
 
The reverse side of this possibility of mutual influencing of the institutions in Europe and the EU 
is the lack of transparency regarding the number of actors and their powers. 
This leads to the very real danger that the individual affected might no longer know where to 
turn in the event of an infringement of rights, if practically all national constitutions contain a 
similar provision as Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, providing for “the right to an 
effective remedy and a fair trial”. 
                                                          
57
Austrian Constitutional Court, U 466/11, U 1836/11 of 14/03/2012, paras 32 et seq.   
58
 European Commission, SWD(2014) 141 final, SWD(2014) 142 final, p. 12.  
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This applies, in particular, also in the relationship between the European Union and the ECHR, 
which will require a new procedure (“co-respondent” mechanism) if the EU accedes to it.59 
There is undoubtedly a risk of citizens getting lost in the “human rights confusion”. Hence the 
state and European authorities and courts must not leave it up to the legally uninitiated 
individual to always choose the right institutional address for his/her complaints and otherwise 
only react rigorously when stating that the appeal is inadmissible. 
It is quite apparent that today the legal order of the EU has no complaint option comparable to a 
constitutional appeal, and that the direct legal protection of the individual on the basis of the 
provisions of the Union member states is generally weak.60 The central bridge must now, and in 
the future too, be the preliminary rulings procedure pursuant to Article 267 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, which gives the ECJ in Luxemburg the opportunity to 
interpret and elaborate on difficult legal issues within the European legal system. However, this 
system can only work if the national courts can follow the principle, as is also proposed in legal 
literature: When in doubt, ask for a preliminary ruling!61 The holding back of important legal 
issues and confining them to national legal systems – on the basis of wrongly understood 
judicial and political entitlement – will in the medium to long-term create more harm than good 
and thus backfire.62 The German Federal Constitutional Court has recently seemed to agree 
with this insight, since in 2014 it filed a request to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling for the first 
time in its history.63 
 
III. The citizens’ trust in the Union as a guardian of human rights 
 
The intention of all these activities is only to provide as effective and comprehensive protection 
and guarantee for the dignity of Europeans. After all, to relate to the first sentence of the Legal 
                                                          
59
 Polakiewicz, E.H.R.L.R. 2013, 6, p. 597 et seq.; Gstrein, ZEuS 2012, point B, II.   
60
 Petzold, Noch einmal: Effektiver Rechtsschutz in Gefahr?, EuZW 2014, p. 290.   
61
 Kühling, Die Nicht-Vorlage als Bärendienst – Plädoyer für eine höhere Kommunikationsfreude im 
Mehrebenensystem, EuZW 2013, p. 642.   
62
 Ibid.   
63
 BVerfGE, decisions of 17/12/2013 and 14/01/2014, 2 BvR 1390/12 (partially separated as 2 BvR 2728/13), 2 BvR 
1421/12 (partially separated as 2 BvR 2729/13), 2 BvR 1438/12 (partially separated as 2 BvR 2730/13), 2 BvR 
1439/12, 2 BvR 1440/12, 2 BvR 1824/12 (partially separated as 2 BvR 2731/13), 2 BvE 6/12 (partially separated as 2 
BvE 13/13).   
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Explanations of the Charter: The dignity of the human person is not only a fundamental right in 
itself but constitutes the real basis of fundamental rights.64 
If the European Union is to win the hearts of people and turn an idea into a feeling,65 the basic 
guarantees of the rule of law must be secured. The European Union, and particularly the ECJ, 
has certainly taken some notable initiatives in recent times. However, the goal is still far off. This 
challenge will indeed never be met. And the actual situation will never correspond to the desired 
ideal. But this Herculean task is not the labours of Sisyphus! 
Since the concept of dignity is not a legal one but has to be reflected in some way in the legal 
system,66 it corresponds both to the nature of this concept and also to the European idea if the 
different legal systems can mutually enhance one another without our needing to fear for the 
unity or integrity of the whole order. 
 
D. Conclusion and outlook 
 
This paper has aimed to show that the European Union is trying to further develop the 
protection of human rights in Europe. It is encouraging to see that there is an element of 
strengthening the protection of fundamental rights while, at the same time, it is possible to 
identify an integrative component. 
The ECJ and EU institutions intend to bring Europe closer to the EU citizens by increasingly 
ensuring a high level of protection with regard to fundamental and human rights issues. In the 
end, it was this element of supranationality that, after the Second World War, turned the 
European system of human rights protection into a global role model for other world regions 
concerning its institutional structure. 
This re-orientation process of the European Union is not taking place on an entirely voluntary 
basis. The EU is under immense external and internal pressure. In view of the impending 
accession of the EU to the ECHR, the European Court of Justice would be wise to protect its 
sole right to interpret EU law in practice, as laid down in Article 19(1) sentence 2 TEU, against 
                                                          
64
 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007/C 303/02), as last revised on 14/12/2007, 
Explanation on Article 1 – Human dignity.   
65
 Based on the statement of the Irish singer Bono Vox from 07/03/2014 in front of the congress of the European 
People’s Party in Dublin: „Europe is a thought that still needs to become a feeling“.   
66
 Cf. in this regard Herdegen, in: Maunz/Dürig (eds.), Grundgesetz Kommentar, 69th delivery, München 2013, part 
B, I., IV., para 52.   
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the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Moreover, the citizens will only accept a 
united Europe if it offers a tangible hope for a brighter future. It is thus necessary to guarantee 
an effective and well-oiled system of protection for the fundamental rights of individuals. 
In the end, this last conclusion should be paramount. Nowadays, the question is no longer 
whether we should venture to tackle the European project or not. If anyone asks about what the 
old Europe has to offer to the world, the answer can only be: social exchange and a life in peace 
and mutual respect in a way that is unique on this planet.  
The European Union has proved that it has the potential to improve everybody’s lives. But how 
do we shape it in order to exploit its full potential? Its re-definition as a protector of human rights 
is a key element in this process. 
Thank you for your attention! 
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